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I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the First World War, cigarette smoking has been a popular
habit in the United States.' As recently as 1966, 42% of the adults in the
United States smoked,2 and in 1978 an estimated 54 million Americans
smoked 615 billion cigarettes. 3 During the last sixteen years, however, the
popularity of tobacco smoking has suffered some severe jolts. In 1964, the
Surgeon General determined that cigarette smoking was hazardous to the
health of the smoker and proclaimed it a health hazard of sufficient magni-
tude to warrant remedial action.4 The 1972 Surgeon General's report
announced that cigarette smoking was not only dangerous to the smoker,
1. S. WAGNER, CIGARETTE COUNTRY: TOBACCO IN AmEmcAN HISTORY AND
PoLrrcs 36-44 (1971). The ambivalent public attitude toward smoking is reflected
by Mark Twain's description of smoking as "The Majestic Vice." S. CLEMENS,
THE ADVENTURES OF Toms SAWYER 114 (1963).
2. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH vii (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 REPORT].
The percentage has since dropped to 33%. Id.
3. Id.
4. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH 33 (1964) [hereinafter cited as 1964 REPORT].
444
1
Swingle: Swingle: Legal Conflict between Smokers and Nonsmokers: The Majestic Vice Versus the Right to Clean Air
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1980
NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS
but probably dangerous to the people around him, too.6 The 1975 and 1979
reports confirmed this finding.6
As the dangers of smoking have become more understood, several
measures have been taken to protect people who, choose not to smoke from
those who smoke: states have enacted statutes;7 cities have passed ordi-
nances;8 federal legislation has been suggested and, in some cases, imple-
mented; 9 constitutional arguments have been formulated;' 0 common law
protections have found new application;" and, familiar tort theories have
been considered.1 2 The purpose of this Comment is to analyze the legal
conflict between smokers and nonsmokers with special emphasis upon the
legal remedies that exist for the nonsmoker who cares enough about his
rights to seek legal redress.
II. EARLY HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SMOKERS AND NoNsMoKERS
Although the legal battle between smokers and nonsmokers is a recent
development in many ways, in some respects it is a resurrection of an
earlier crusade against smokers.' 8 Restrictions on smoking reached their
zenith in the United States around the turn of the century. In 1901, twelve
states had statutes restricting or forbidding the sale or use of cigarettes.14
Cigarette smoking was considered reprehensible and immoral,' 5 in addition
to being a fire hazard.' 6 The nonsmoking statutes did not remain on the
books very long, though; the fiasco of prohibition turned the public mood
against such absolute prohibitions and the nonsmoking statutes were re-
pealed simultaneously with the demise of the eighteenth amendment. By
1927, all of the statutes forbidding the sale or use of cigarettes had been
repealed.17
Between 1927 and 1964 very few smoking laws existed. In the late
sixties and throughout the seventies, however, more and more studies con-
firmed the danger a smoking cigarette presents to nearby nonsmokers,
5. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH 117-35 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 REPORT].
6. 1979 REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 11: PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPART-
mENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMsOK-
ING: A REPORT To THE SURGEON GENERAL (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 REPORT].
7. See text accompanying notes 57-120 infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 121-30 infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 136-46 infra.
10. See notes 147-83 and accompanying text infra.
11. See notes 184-200 and accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 201-74 and accompanying text infra.
13. See generally S. WAGNER, note 1 supra; Annot., 20 A.L.R. 926 (1922).
14. Comment, The Resurgence and Validity of Antismoking Legislation, 7
U. CAL. D.L. REv. 167, 169 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Antismoking Legislation].
15. Comment, The Non-Smoker in Public: A Review and Analysis of Non-
Smokers' Rights, 7 SAN FERN. V.L. REv. 141, 148 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Non-
Smoker].
16. Antismoking Legislation, supra note 14, at 168.
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and nonsmokers began asserting their right to safety. Anti-smoking statutes
are appearing again,'18 although the modem statutes are significantly dif-
ferent from their predecessors. When the early laws were enacted, cigarette
smoke had not been proven dangerous to humans. 19 Today that danger is
widely recognized.2 0 While the early statutes were enacted~largely to enforce
moral behavior and to prevent fire hazards, 2' the recent statutes are spe-
cifically designed to protect people from the health dangers of cigarette
smoke.2 2 Also, while the older statutes were aimed at prohibiting all ciga-
rette smoking, modern statutes seek only to protect people in public places
from the smoke of others.23 The modern statutes, unlike the overbroad
early laws,24 are probably here to stay.
III. MEDICAL EVIDENCE ON THE HARM OF "INVOLUNTARY SMOKING"
The widely recognized dangers of tobacco smoking2 5 to the smoker
lend credence to Horace Greeley's definition of a cigar as "a fire at one
end and a fool at the other." 26 The scientific evidence on the subject is so
overwhelming that courts have taken judicial notice of "the toxic nature
of cigarette smoke and its well known association with emphysema, lung
cancer and heart disease." 27 In 1979, cigarette smoking was the single most
18. See notes 50135 and accompanying text infra.
19. Speculation existed, though. The Tennessee Supreme Court had this to
say about cigarettes as long ago as 1900:
We think they are not [legitimate articles of commerce] because wholly
noxious and deleterious to health. Their use is always harmful, never
beneficial. They possess no virtue, but are inherently bad, and bad only.
They find no true commendation for merit or usefulness in any sphere.
On the contrary, they are widely condenned as pernicious altogether.
Bey'ond question, their every tendency is towards the impairment of
physical health and mental vigor. There is no proof in the record as to
the character of cigarettes, yet their character is so well and so generally
known to be that stated above that the courts are authorized to take ju-
dicial cognizance of the fact ....
Austin v. State, 101 Tenn. 563, 566, 48 S.W. 305, 306 (1898), afjrd, 179 U.S. 343(1900).
20. See notes 25-49 and accompanying text infra.
21. See notes 15 &c 16 and accompanying text supra.
22. 'See note 68 and accompanying text infra.
23. See note 135 and accompanying text infra.
24. Although a city ordinance entirely banning smoking in public streets
because of the fire hazard was upheld in Commonwealth v. Thompson, 53 Mass.(12 Met.) 231 (1847), similar statutes were found too broad in Zion v. Behrens,
262 Ill. 510, 104 N.E. 836 (1914), and Hershberg v. Barbourville. 142 Ky. 60, 133
S.W. 985 (1911). For a lengthy discussion of early antismoking action, see Anti-
smoking Legislation, supra note 14, at 168-75.
25. All tobacco smoking can be dangerous to involuntary smokers. (For the
definition of involuntary smoking, see text accompanying note 30 infra.) Scientific
research indicates that pipe and cigar smoke contain the same compounds found
in cigarette smoke. See generally 1979 REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 13. When the
phrase "cigarette smoking" is used in this Comment, cigars and pipes are also
included.
26. S. WAGNER, supra note 1, at 31.
27. Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 145 N.J. Super. 516, 527, 368 A.2d
[Vol. 45
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important preventable environmental factor contributing to illness, disa-
bility, and death in the United States, and health damage resulting from
cigarette smoking cost the nation an estimated 27 billion dollars in medical
care, absenteeism, decreased work productivity, and accidents.2 8 In 1970, a
public opinion poll reported that 87.5% of the population agreed with the
statement: "Smoking cigarettes is harmful to health. '29 Despite the wide
recognition that cigarette smoking is harmful to the smoker, less is known
about the danger of involuntary smoking.
Involuntary smoking, also called passive smoking or second-hand
smoking,. occurs when a nonsmoker breathes air that contains the tobacco
smoke of a smoker.30 The tobacco smoke in the air comes from two sources:
mainstream and sidestream smoke. Mainstream smoke is the smoke that is
pulled through the cigarette by the smoker. It is filtered both by the ciga-
rette and the lungs of the smoker. Sidestream smoke is the unfiltered smoke
from the lit end of a burning cigarette, which, because of the lack of
filtering, is even more dangerous to the nonsmoker than the exhaled smoke
from the smoker's mouth.3 '
Only recently has involuntary smoking been recognized as a health
hazard. The bombshell 1964 Surgeon General's report did not discuss
involuntary smoking. The 1972 report, however, mentioned the possible
hazards- of involuntary smoking,32 and the 1975 and 1979 reports contain
additional findings in this regard.3 3 In addition, the American College of
Chest Physicians, the World Health Organization, and the World Confer-
ence on Smoking and Health have issued statements warning of the dangers
of involuntary smoking.3 4 The latter two organizations have recommended
restrictions on smoking in public places. 35 Also, involuntary smoking has
been the subject of a large number of recent articles in medical journals
and other scholarly publications.3 6
408, 414 (App. Div. 1976). Accord, 29 AM. JUR. 2d Evidence § 120 (1967) (citing four
cases). Several legislatures have specifically recognized the danger of cigarette smoke.
See notes 66-68 and accompanying text infra.
28. 1979 REPORT, supra note 2, at vii.
29. Antismoking Legislation, supra note 14, at 181.
30. See 1979 REPORT, supra note 2, at 11-15.
31. A. BRODY 9c B. BRODY, THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF NONSMOKERs 21 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as BRODY]; Non-smoker, supra note 15, at 144.
32. 1972 REP'ORT, note 5 supra.
33. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
34. BRODY, supra note 31, at 14; AcTIoN ON SMOKING & HEALTH, HISTORY OF
THE WAR AGAINST SMOKING 1964-1978 (n.d.). Action On Smoking and Health
(ASH), 2000 H. Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006, is a national non-profit
charitable organization dedicated to reducing "the deadly toll of smoking, and
to protect[ing] the rights of nonsmokers." Id. ASH was formed in 1967 by attorneys,
physicians, and other citizens who felt there was a need for legal action against
smoking.
35. BRODY, supra note 31, at 14.
36. The 1979 REPORT, note 2 supra, lists 85 documents relating to the dangers
of involuntary smoking. Humorist Art Buchwald reports "another side to the
story. Smokers believe that Involuntary Smokers are just getting a free smoke
from the cigarette addict." Buchwald quotes a smoker, one Morris Phillip, as
1980]
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Although the full extent of the dangers of involuntary smoking is not
yet known, certain conclusions have already been stated with confidence:
1. Most healthy people in involuntary smoking situations
suffer minor eye and throat irritation.3 7
2. Involuntary smoking by healthy people can cause slight
deterioration in psychomotor performance, especially attentive-
ness and cognitive function.38
3. Involuntary smoking does significant harm to fetuses,
infants, and children.3 9
4. People with certain heart diseases may suffer exacerba-
tions of their symptoms as a result of involuntary smoking.4 0
5. People with certain lung diseases (e.g., chronic bronchitis,
emphysema) have considerable excess mortality under conditions
of severe air pollution, and involuntary smoking situations can
produce pollutants to a degree as high or higher than those that
occur during air pollution emergencies. 41 The U.S. Public Health
Service reports that there are 15 million people with such
chronic lung problems in the United States.42
6. Many individuals appear to be allergic to tobacco smoke.43
Estimates range from 1.5 million to at least 34 million.44 -Symptoms
vary from "eye irritation, nasal symptoms, headache, cough,
wheezing, sore throat, nausea, hoarseness, dizziness, upper respira-
tory tract distress, choking sensation, loss of memory, lightheaded-
ness, difficulty in concentration, depressive personality changes,
double vision, short blackouts, to lesions on the skin."45
saying, "We primary smokers are sick and tired of being bugged by secondary
smokers, particularly when they start wheezing and sneezing and having a good
time at our expense." Columbia (Mo.) Tribune, July 31, 1979, at 4, col. 1.
37. 1979 REPORT, supra note 2, at 11-25; 1975 REPORT, supra note 6, at 107;
Antismoking Legislation, supra note 14, at 178.
38. 1979 REPORT, supra note 2, at 11-34.
39. BRODY, supra note 31, at 33; PUBLIC HEALTH SERviCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, THE SMOKING DIGEST 26 (1977) (hereinafter
cited as SMOKING DIGEST].
40. 1979 REPORT, supra note 2, at 11-29; 1975 REPORT, supra note 6, at 107;
SMOKING DIGEST, supra note 39, at 24. A recent experiment concluded that in-
voluntary smoking is deleterious to the nonsmoker and significantly reduces small
airways function. White 8 Froeb, Small-Airways Dysfunction in Nonsmokers
Chronically Exposed To Tobacco Smoke, 302 NEw ENG. J. MED. 720 (1980).
41. 1979 REPORT, supra note 2, at 11-31; 1975 REPORT, supra note 6, at 105;
SMOKING DIGEST, supra note 39, at 24-26.
42. Testimony of David P. Cook, Program Director of the American Lung
Association of Western Missouri, before the Judiciary Committee of the Missouri
House of Representatives (Jan. 16, 1979).
43. BRODY, supra note 31, at 33; SMOKING DIGEsT, supra note 39, at 24. The
1979 REPORT, note 2 supra, states. "the existence of a true tobacco allergy has not
been clearly established," but speculates that people allergic to other things may
also be allergic to tobacco smoke. Id. at 11-31.
44. BRODY, supra note 31, at 33; Comment, Where There's Smokc There's
Ire: The Search for Legal Paths to Tobacco-Free Air, 3 COLUM. J. ENVT'L L. 62,
67 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Ire].
45. BRODY, supra note 31, at 33 (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 45
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7. Involuntary smoking may contribute to the development
of serious diseases in otherwise healthy individuals.4 6
In short, the danger of cigarette smoke to nonsmokers is a 'significant
health problem. Most healthy people experience discernible, physical irri-
tation as a result of involuntary smoking.47 Moreover, an exposure to
involuntary smoking that causes only minor consequences to a healthy
person may have a much more severe effect on children, people with
allergies, or people suffering from heart or lung disease.48 The number of
people seriously affected by the smoke of other people's cigarettes may be
as high as 34 million.4 9
IV. SMOKING LEGISLATION
A. Public Attitude
The recent revelations about the dangers of involuntary smoking have
prompted a great deal of legislative action during the seventies. Federal,
state, and local governments and agencies are heeding the growing medical
evidence and the changing attitudes of the public about smoking. As
awareness of the danger of smoking has increased, the attitude of people
toward smokers has altered significantly. In surveys done by the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare,50 people were asked to respond to the
statement, "It is annoying to be near a person who is smoking cigarettes."
Their responses:
1964 1966 1970
Agree 44.8% 47.4% 58.5%
Disagree 51.7% 48.6% 38.3%
A 1978 survey in St. Joseph, Missouri,5 1 asked the same question. Over
46. More than 3000 components of tobacco smoke have been identified,
and several have been implicated in the development of specific diseases.
Upwards of 90% of cigarette smoke is composed largely of a dozen gases
that are hazardous to health, and the remainder is particulate matter, of
which tar and nicotine are two of the best known components.
SMOKING DIGFST, supra note 39, at 17. Research done on laboratory animals has
serious implications for human beings: a significant number of mice exposed to
second-hand smoke over a two-year period developed severe bronchitis and in-
flammation of the bronchial tubes that connect the windpipe with the lungs; rabbits
exposed to smoke from 20 cigarettes per day for two to five years developed em-
physema; dogs exposed to cigarette smoke ten times per week for one year suffered
a breakdown in lung tissues; rats exposed to second-hand smoke for 45 minutes a
day for two to six months showed twice as many lung tumors as a control group.
SEcoND-HA"D Smor.E-AN AmERICAN LUNG AssOCrATION BROCHURE, reprinted in
D. StiMP, How TO PRoTECT Your HEALTH AT Wom 115-21 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as SHImP BOOK].
47. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
48. 1979 REPORT, supra note 2, at 11-29.
49. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
50. Antismoking Legislation, suprar note 14, at 181.
51. The St. Joseph Chapter of the Center for Nonsmokers' Rights conducted
a 100-call random telephone survey of adults 18 years and older (Feb. 1978). In-
formation obtained from the American Lung Association of Western Missouri, 2007
Broadway, Kansas City, Mo. 64108.
1980]
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60% of the population surveyed agreed with the statement, and 40% of
the smokers agreed with it.52
In the surveys, the people were also asked for a response to the state-
ment, "The smoking of cigarettes should be allowed in fewer places than
it is now."53 Even in 1964, 51.2% agreed with the statement. 54 Since then,
the percentage of people agreeing has steadily increased. 55 A nation-wide
study conducted in 1978 for the Tobacco Institute by the Roper Organiza-
tion had the following results: 62% favored separating smokers from.non-
smokers at train stations, airports, and bus stations; 61% favored separation
in the work place; 73% favored separation at indoor sporting events; and
73% favored separation in eating places.5 6 The survey results clearly indi-
cate that the legislator who advocates a statute restricting smoking in
public has the support of a majority of Americans.
B. State Statutes
As of 1980, thirty-four states and the District of Columbia have
legislation restricting smoking in various places in order to reduce involun-
tary smoking, and one state accomplishes the same result by extensive
administrative regulations. 57 The statutes restricting smoking vary greatly
52. Smokers Nonsmokers Combined %
Agree 40% 75% 61%
Disagree 52.5% 21.7% 34%
Don't know 7.5% 3.3% 5%
53. See notes 50 & 51 supra.
54. Antismoking Legislation, supra note 14, at 181.
55.
HEW Survey 1978 St. Joseph Survey
Non- ' Combined
1964 1966 1970 Smokers smokers %
Agree 51.2% 51.8% 56.8% 35% 68.3% 55%
Disagree 38.8% 36.8% 36.3% 55% 15% 31%
Don't know - - - 10% 16.7% 14%
56. Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1979, at 5, col. 2.
57. For states enacting legislation to reduce involuntary smoking, see Groups
I, II, and III below. Other states have legislation restricting smoking, enacted for
reasons other than protecting nonsmokers. See Group IV below. A few states have
no legislation restricting smoking. See Group V below.
GROUP I: ALAsKA STAT. §§ 18.35.300, .310, .320, .330, .340 (Cum. Supp. 1979);
Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-601.01 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3701 to -3703
(Cum. Supp. 1979); CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 25-14-101 to -105 (Cum. Supp. 1978);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21b (West Cum. Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9910
(1977); HAwAII REv. STAT. §§ 321-201 to -206 (1976); IowA CODE §§ 98A.1-.6
(Supp..1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4008 (Cum. Supp. 1979); MAss. GEN. LAWs
ANN. ch. 270, § 21 (West CuM. Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.411-.417 (West
Supp. 1980); 1979 Mont. Laws ch. 868; NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 71-5701 to -5718 (Supp.
1979); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 202.2490-.2492 (1975); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 155.42
(Supp. 1979); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2C:33-13 (Supp. 1979); N.Y. PUB. HEA.T LAW §§
1399-o to 'q (McKinney Supp. 1979); N.D. CE'NT. CODE §§ 23-12-09 to -11 (1978);
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 379.031 (Page Supp. 1979); OK.LA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
1247 (West Supp. 1979); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 23-56-1, -2 (Cum. Supp. 1978); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWs ANN. §§ 22-36-1, -2 (1979); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 48.01
(Vernon Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-101 to -110 (Cum. Supp. 1975);
248 WAC 152 (1975) (Washington state regulations).
( ol. 45
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in scope and function. Twenty-five states have a specific and fairly compre-
hensive statute restricting smoking in public.58 Generally, Clean Indoor
Air legislation containi the four elements that the American Lung Associa-
tion has identified as common to effective anti-smoking legislation:
1. Definition of terms, particularly those words which have
more than one connotation (e.g., "public place").
2. Requirement that plainly visible signs be posted in all
areas where smoking is restricted or prohibited to alert everyone
to the regulations in effect.
3. Clear delegation of authority: identification of the offic-
ials and/or agencies responsible for the publicity, posting, and
enforcement of the regulations.
4. Designation of penalties for violations to provide incen-
tives for adhering to the regulations.59
GROUP 11: MD. ANN. CODE art. 38A, § 23 (1957) (fireworks), art. 43, § 54-I
(1957) (physicians' offices, nursing homes, hospitals), art. 43, § 200 (1957) (food
canning), art. 78, § 35A (Supp. 1979) (buses), art. 89, § 64 (1957) (elevators);
Micr. Comp. LAws §§ 333.21333 (1980) (homes for the aged), 333.21531 (1980)
(hospitals), 333.21733 (1980) (nursing homes), 408.820 (Supp. 1980) (elevators),
289.707a (Supp. 1980) (retail food establishments), 333.12905 (1980) (restaurants),
289.129 (1967) (canneries); OR. PEv. STAT. §§ 243.345, .350 (1979) (state offices),
192.710 (1979) (public meetings), 441.815 (1979) (hospitals), 479.015 (1979) (ele-
vators).
GROUP HI: CAL. HEALTH & SAFET, CODE §§ 25940, 25940.5, 25941 to 25947
(West Supp. 1980) (certain areas in publicly owned buildings); CAL. PuB.
UTIL. CODE § 561 (West Supp. 1980) (public transportation) (California's Clean In-
door Air Act, ch. 10.7, was rejected at the general election held Nov. 7, 1978); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1326 (1979) (buses); D.C. CODE ANN. § 44-216 (Supp. 1978)
(public transportation); FLA. STAT. §§ 823.12 (1976) (elevators), 255.27 (Supp. 1980)
(government buildings); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-5904 to -5906 (1979) (public meetings);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-35-1(4), (7) (1972) (buses); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 361 (Pur-
don Supp. 1980) (hospitals); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 3702 (Purdon 1972) (retail
stores); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1225 (Purdon 1977) (theatres, public assemblies);
WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 47.56.730 (Supp. 1980) (ferries).
GROUP IV: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 961, § 2105 (Smith-Hurd 1979) (mines); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 96 , § 2013 (Smith-Hurd 1979) (magazine); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 127 , § 109 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1976) (fireworks); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-
1-22-21, 16-6-4-23 (Burns 1973) (food processed or stored); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 352.170(3) (Baldwin 1977) (mines); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 438.050 (Baldwin
Cum. Supp. 1978) (school premises); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:416(A) (West
Supp. 1980) (school premises); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2433 (1964) (mills,
buses, factories, shipyards; fire prevention in mind); RSMo § 320.130 (1978) (fire-
works); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 63-7,2, -3, 63-14-17 (1974) (mines); S.C. CODE §§ 23-35-90,
-100 (1976) (fireworks); S.C. CODE § 59-67-150 (1976) (school bus); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 53-3011 (1977) (fireworks); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 59-6-103(b), 09(j), -510(a),
-7-106 (1980) (mines); TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-7-108(h) (1980) (magazine); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2752 (1968) (building with sign posted; fire prevention meas-
ure); VA. CODE § 3.1-879 (1973) (food processing); VA. CODE § 45.1-39 (1974) (maga-
zines); VA. CODE § 45.1-98 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1979) (mines); W. VA. CODE § 21-3-8
(1978) (factories, mercantile establishments); W. VA. CODE § 16-9-7 (1979) (schools);
W. VA. CODE § 22-2-57(b) (1978) (mines); W. VA. CODE § 22-2-53 (1978) (mine
surface); Wyo. STAT. § 30-6-107 (1977) (mines).
GROUP V: Alabama, North Carolina, and Wisconsin.
58. Group I, note 57 supra.
59. SMOKING DiGmsT, supra note 39, at 83.
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Three states have a group of statutes, rather than one single comprehensive
statute, which limit the places where smoking may occur.60 In effect, these
statutes are probably just as comprehensive as those in most single-statute
states. Seven states and the District of Columbia have statutes for protection
of nonsmokers that only prohibit smoking in a particular public place.61
These statutes typically mention only buses or elevators, although some
proscribe smoking in certain public meetings, government buildings,
retail stores, or hospitals. Thirteen states have statutes prohibiting smoking
in certain areas, not because of the air pollution danger to nonsmokers,
but because of fire hazards, food contamination, or restrictions on smoking
by children at school.6 2 Three states have no statutes prohibiting smoking.6 3
All twenty-five comprehensive anti-smoking statutes were enacted
since 1974. The first state to pass a comprehensive law prohibiting smoking
in designated public places was Arizona.64 The most recent was Connecti-
cut, where the Connecticut Clean Indoor Air Act went into effect October
1, 1979.65 The comprehensive statutes vary greatly in detail, but many of
them contain similar characteristics.
Several state statutes declare in a preamble that smoking is a health
hazard6 6 or a public nuisance.67 A few legislatures have gone even further
in stating the statutory purpose, saying that the statute is meant to protect
the right of the nonsmoker to breathe clean air.68 Such a statement of
60. Group II, note 57 supra.
61. Group III, note 57 supra.
62. Group IV, note 57 supra.
63. Group V, note 57 supra.
64. ACION ON SMOKING & HEALTH, HISTORY OF THE WAR AGAINST SMOKING
1964-1978 (n.d.).
65. AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION OF WESTERN MISSOURI, SMOKING AND HEALTH
REPORT (Sept. 1979). In Missouri, the Missouri Clean Indoor Air Act passed out of
the Interstate Committee with a 3-2-1 vote in January 1980. The bill, however,
died on the Perfection Calendar.
66. See laws from Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Minnesota, Ne-
braska, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washington, cited note
57 supra.
67. See laws from Alaska, Arizona, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota
(statute listed under heading Public Nuisance), and Idaho (statute listed under
heading Public Nuisance), cited note 57 supra.
68. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3701 (Cum. Supp. 1979) provides:
Information available to the General Assembly based upon scientific re-
search data has shown that nonsmokers often receive damage to their
health from the smoking of tobacco by others. It is therefore declared to
be the public policy of the state of Arkansas that the rights of nonsmokers
be protected in the manner provided in this Act.
The Rhode Island "Smoking in Public Places" statute, R.I. GEN. LAwS § 23-56-1
(Cum. Supp. 1978), has a similar preamble:
The use of tobacco for smoking purposes is being found to be increasingly
dangerous, not only to the person smoking but also to the non-smoking
person who is required to breathe such contaminated air. The most per-
vasive intrusion of the non-smoker's right to unpolluted air space is the
uncontrolled smoking in public places. The legislature intends, by the en-
actment of this chapter, to protect the health and atmospheric environ-
ment of the non-smoker by regulating smoking in certain public places.
[Vol. 45
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legislative intent and purpose seems to be a good idea. A statute restricting
smoking might have been enacted for any of several reasons, including the
protection of air, the protection of food, the protection of the community
from fire, or the protection of the morals of minors.0 9 Situations could arise
where the intent of the legislature would be significant, and in such a
situation it helps to have the intent clearly spelled out.
A preamble stating that the legislature recognizes the dangers of
involuntary smoking might also be useful for educational and public
policy reasons. Since the dangers of involuntary smoking have only be-
come publicized during the seventies and many skeptics still exist,70 formal
recognition of the danger by a state legislature that has heard the evidence
can only serve to help the public by further educating them on the issue.
Moreover, use of the words "rights of the nonsmoker" emphasizes that
nonsmokers do have the right to breathe clean air.71
The definition given smoking in nonsmokers' rights legislation is
important. Many states use the definition: "Smoking in a place or vehicle
includes the possession, in that place or vehicle, of a lighted cigarette,
cigarillo, cigar, or pipe."72 Several statutes include the additional phrase,
"or any other lighted smoking equipment." 73 Under this phrasing, any
newly developed tobacco product that is not necessarily a cigarette, cigarillo,
cigar, or pipe would still be covered.74
The designation of where smoking is prohibited is one of the most
important parts of the Clean Indoor Air legislation. A few states prohibit
smoking in all indoor public places not designated as smoking areas.75
Representative of these statutes is Montana's definition of "indoor public
place" as "any indoor area, room, or vehicle used by the general public or
serving as a place of work, including but not limited to restaurants, stores,
offices, trains, buses, educational or health care facilities, auditoriums,
arenas, assembly and meeting rooms."' 7 6 This seems a much more efficient
statute than one that attempts to list all of the various indoor public places
where smoking is prohibited. Since involuntary smoking is dangerous to
nonsmokers, it seems better public policy to start with the presumption
that smoking is not allowed in any indoor public place, and then provide
69. BRODY, supra note 31, at 154.
70. See note 131 and accompanying text infra.
71. For the argument that the right to breathe dean air is a fundamental
right protected by the Constitution, see notes 147-83 and accompanying text infra.
72. E.g., IowA CODE § 98A.1 (Supp. 1980).
73. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.413 (West Supp. 1980).
74. Professor Alvan Brody drafted a model statute with a slightly different
definition: "'Smoking' means carrying or possessing any lighted tobacco product,
except temporarily possessing a tobacco product lighted by another for purposes
of immediate extinguishment." BRODY, supra note 31, at 107.
75. See laws from Colorado, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, and
Utah, cited note 57 supra.
76. 1979 Mont. Laws ch. 368, § 3(2) (emphasis added).
1980]
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol45/iss3/4
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
specific smoking areas, than to start with the presumption that smoking
is allowed, except in certain forbidden places.77
In the statutes that list places where smoking is prohibited, some areas
are listed more frequently than others: twenty-four states and the District
of Columbia prohibit smoking in public transportation;7 8 twenty-four
prohibit smoking in elevators; 79 twenty-three prohibit smoking in public
waiting rooms or various other parts of health care facilities;8 0 twenty-one
prohibit smoking in places of recreition or entertainment, like libraries,
museums, theaters, lecture or concert halls, auditoriums, or swimming
pools;s' fifteen prohibit smoking in public schools;82 twelve prohibit
smoking in state-owned buildings;8 3 eleven prohibit smoking in public
meetings;8 4 nine restrict smoking in restaurants;8 5 seven prohibit smoking
in supermarkets or food stores;8 6 six prohibit smoking in public department
stores;87 six prohibit or restrict smoking in any place where the proprietor
has posted a "No Smoking" sign;88 and six prohibit smoking in any public
place "including but not limited to" a list of specified places.89
77. "Model legislation should ban smoking everywhere nonsmokers have a
legal right to be. The burden should be on the smoker to discover where smoking
is permitted." BRoDY, supra note 31, at 106.
78. See laws from Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Washington, cited note
57 supra.
79. See laws from Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Texas, and Washington, cited note 57 supra.
80. See laws from Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa,
Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Da-
kota, Texas, Utah, and Washington, cited note 57 supra.
81. See laws from Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and
Washington, cited note 57 supra.
82. See laws from Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Texas, and Washington, cited note 57 supra.
83. See laws from California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Minne-
sota, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, and Utah, cited note 57
supra.
84. See laws from Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Washington, cited note 57 supra.
85. See laws from Colorado, Connecticut, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana,
North Dakota, Ohio, Nebraska, and Utah, cited note 57 supra.
86. See laws from California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Nebraska, and Rhode Island, cited note 57 supra.
87. See laws from Colorado, Minnesota, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Utah, and
Washington, cited note 57 supra.
88. See laws from Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
and Utah, cited note 57 supra.
89. See note 75 supra.
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Most of the specifically named no-smoking areas share the characteristic
of being a public place where many people are gathered closely together.
Buses, elevators, waiting rooms, theaters, classrooms, and public meeting
halls are all viewed as places where if one person smokes, everyone smokes,
whether they hold the cigarette or not. These are the most obvious places
where smoking should be prohibited.
Another obvious place where smoking should be prohibited is the
health care facility. Because people who suffer heart and lung disease have
been proven to be the most susceptible to immediate injury from exposure
to cigarette smoke, 90 smoking should clearly be prohibited in the places
where the sick have gone to seek medical assistance.
An often overlooked place where smoking should be prohibited or
restricted is the workplace. Only at the workplace is the nonsmoker re-
quired to spend eight hours per day at his assigned spot. If the spot is next
to a smoker, the nonsmoker will probably experience some discomfort or
even illness. 91 Many companies have voluntarily prohibited smoking in
the workplace.92 Several offer bonuses to employees who stop smoking.93
Other companies, however, may prefer to irritate the nonsmokers than the
smokers. 94 The statutes in Colorado,95 Minnesota,96 Montana,97 Nebras-
ka,98 Oregon,99 and Utah 0 0 contain sections specifically dealing with
smoking in the workplace.
The Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, and Utah statutes specify enclosed
indoor areas "serving as a place of work" as areas where smoking is pro-
hibited. The Minnesota statute is representative. It states that "the de-
partment of labor and industry shall, in consultation with the state board
of health, establish rules to restrict or prohibit smoking in those places of
work where the close proximation of workers or the inadequacy of ventila-
tion causes smoke pollution detrimental to the health and comfort of non-
90. See notes 40-45 and accompanying text supra.
91. A recent study indicates that 70% of nonsmokers who are not allergic to
tobacco smoke suffer eye irritation when exposed to tobacco smoke. Of nonsmok-
ers with allergies, 73% suffer eye irritation. The figures for nasal irritation are
29% and 67%, respectively. See Antismoking Legislation, supra note 14, at 178.
92. J.C. Penney, N.L.T. Corp., and Continental Illinois Bank separate smok-
ers from nonsmokers. SHImp Boor, supra note 46, at 3. Thomas Edison refused to
hire smokers. S. WAGNER, supra note 1, at 42.
93. Cybertek Computer Products, Inc., of Los Angeles, Intermatic Inc., of
Spring Grove, Ill., and Speed Call Corp., of Hayward, Cal., all pay their
employees not to smoke at work. AcnoN ON SMOKING AND HEALTh, ASH NEws-
zr= (Jan.-Feb. 1980).
94. Professor Alfred W. Blumrosen has suggested that a company might take
this approach out of inertia. Snmu, BooK, supra note 46, at 42.
95. CoLo. Rxv. STAT. § 25-14-102 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
96. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.413 (West Supp. 1980).
97. 1979 Mont. Laws ch. 368, § 3(2).
98. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-5704 (Supp. 1979).
99. OR. Rlv. STAT. § 243.350 (1979). The Oregon statute restricting smoking
in the workplace only applies to places of employment operated by the state of
Oregon.
100. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-101 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
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smoking employees."1l Although involuntary smoking bothers some non-
smokers less than others, it is important for courts interpreting "comfort"
to be familiar with the evidence that involuntary smoking causes at least
physical discomfort to the majority of its victims. 0 2
One key feature of the legislation restricting smoking in the workplace
is an exception for enclosed offices occupied exclusively by smokers. 03
Under this exception, a private, enclosed office occupied exclusively by
smokers, even if visited by nonsmokers, is not considered a public place
for purposes of the statute. Without this provision, a law prohibiting
smoking in the workplace could have the unintended effect of prohibiting
smoking in the confines of one's private office.
Some statutes restricting smoking include a provision to the effect
that existing physical barriers and ventilation systems shall be used to
minimize the toxic effect of smoking in adjacent nonsmoking areas.10 4
The wisdom of this provision is debatable. Existing partitions and ventila-
tion systems may be ineffective in preventing potentially harmful amounts
of smoke' 05 from drifting into the nonsmokers' areas. On the other hand,
achieving absolute separation by requiring solid walls and new ventilation
systems could be inordinately costly for many businesses and organizations.
The legislatures evidently have balanced these considerations and have
decided the large cost outweighs the questionable harm. Steps should be
taken, however, to ensure that new buildings are designed to protect
nonsmokers from the outset. Also, government and private bodies large
enough to afford the cost should be encouraged to make structural changes
necessary to provide the maximum protection immediately.
Many of the Clean Air statutes require "No Smoking" signs in certain
situations.106 These requirements serve several functions: proprietors who,
might not do so voluntarily are forced to put up the signs; many smokers
notice the signs and presumably obey them; and the people who smoke
in spite of the signs have at least been warned that smoking is prohibited
in the particular area.
Another important provision of the Glean Air legislation is the section
delegating authority for enforcement and implementation. In Minnesota, for
example, the State Commissioner of Health is charged with the responsibility
of adopting regulations to implement the statute.10 7 The commissioner,
a local board of health, and any affected party are specifically given the
authority to institute injunctive action.' 0 8 Other statutes go into less
101. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.414 (West Supp. 1980).
102. See notes 37-49 and accompanying text supra.
103. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.413 (West Supp. 1980).
104. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 71-5708 (Supp. 1979).
105. The smoke from one cigarette smoked in four minutes in a room the size
of a typical office can produce 36 times the amount of tar particulates considered
safe by federal standards. Ire, supra note 44, at 66.
106. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.416 (West Supp. 1980).
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detail, simply saying the provisions of the act shall be supervised and en-
forced by local health boards.109 Many state legislatures have neglected
to include any such provision.
The penalty provisions in the various nonsmokers' rights statutes
differ significantly, though none are as severe as Tsar Michael's penalties
of torture or exile for persons violating his rule against the sale or use of
tobacco. 10 The stiffest penalties in the United States are in Minnesota,
where the offending smoker is subject to a fine of up to five hundred
dollars, or a jail sentence of up to ninety days. 1 1 The least severe penalties
are in Colorado and Massachusetts, which have no penalty provisions at
all.1 2 Typical penalties in other states are fines of "not more than two
hundred dollars,""x 3 "ten to one hundred dollars,"1 4 or as low as five
dollars."15 'Since the purpose of the nonsmoking statutes is to protect the
health of nonsmokers, the stiffer penalties seem justified; the penalty ought
to be at least high enough to deter violations.
Some statutes penalize not only the smoker, but the proprietor, or
person in control of the area, for breach of his duty to protect nonsmok-
ers." 86 In order to justify punishment at this level, the statutes first create
a duty. For example, the Minnesota statute states that the proprietor or
other person in charge of a public place shall make reasonable efforts to
prevent smoking by: (1) posting "No Smoking" signs; (2) arranging
separate smoking and no-smoking areas; (3) requesting smokers violating
the law to cease; or (4) by other appropriate means." 7 Several states inflict
a higher penalty on proprietors who have failed to stop the smoker than
on the smoker himself." 8 A proprietor who faces a potential $500 fine for
his failure to act has a strong incentive to take affirmative action to stop
smoking in no smoking areas.
Another statutory remedy available to the nonsmoker in some states
is the injunction. Minnesota law specifically allows an injunction to be
sought by the State Commissioner of Health, a local board of health, or any
affected party."19 Even in states where injunctive relief is not expressly
allowed by statute, it might be available under common law theories.
120
109. 1979 Mont. Laws ch. 568, § 8.
110. S. WAGNER, supra note 1, at 12.
111. MmN STAT. ANN. § 609.08(3) (West Supp. 1980). Utah also has a stiff
penalty, providing for a fine of up to $299 and a jail sentence not exceeding 90
days. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-8-204, -205, ,801, -10-110 (1978).
112. CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 25-14-101 to -105 (Cum. Supp. 1978); MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 270, § 21 (West Cum. Supp. 1980).
113. E.g., N.J. Rlv. STAT. § 2C:8-13 (Supp. 1979).
114. E.g., ARx. STAT. ANN. § 82-8708 (Gum. Supp. 1979).
115. E.g., IowA CODE § 98A.6 (Supp. 1980) ($5 for the first violation,
$10 to $100 for each subsequent violation).
116. See laws from Alaska, Connecticut, Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Utah, cited note 57 supra.
117. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.416 (West Supp. 1980).
118. See laws from Alaska, North Dakota, and Utah, cited note 57 supra.
119. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.417 (West Supp. 1980).
120. See notes 184-200 and accompanying text infra.
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In addition to the many state laws concerning involuntary smoking,
several local ordinances are on the books. Chicago has a special "smokers'
court," the Public Safety Court, set up in 1975 to prosecute violators of the
ban on smoking in public places. 121 New York City and Cincinnati have
ordinances prohibiting smoking;122 Kansas City has ordinances prohibiting
smoking on buses and in stores; 123 and St. Louis has ordinances prohibiting
smoking on buses, on street cars, in the multi-sports arena, and in motion
picture projection booths.' 2 4
Although many state and local measures exist, the enforcement of
these laws has had uneven success. In Florida in 1976, a man was convicted
and fined $250 for smoking in an elevator. 2 5 A nonsmoker with a chronic
bronchial asthma condition had been in the elevator with the smoker and,
pointing to the "No Smoking by Law" sign, had asked that he stop smoking.
The man declared that he had enough money to pay a fine and he blew
smoke into the face of the nonsmoker. The nonsmoker filed a complaint,
and the smoker became the first person ever to be convicted and fined for
smoking in an elevator. 126 In Minnesota in 1976, George McKeever, a 70-
year-old man, was convicted under the Minnesota Clean Indoor Air Act
and fined $10.127 The judge, who did not approve of the Minnesota law,
suspended the minimum fine and dismissed the old man with the gentle
rebuke, "Go and sin no more."' 28 The result of the McKeever case may
have been affected by factual questions of whether the old man's pipe had
been lit, and whether the nonsmoker had banged him in the leg with her
shopping cart. A survey conducted by the Minnesota Tribune in June 1978
indicated that 75% of Minnesota nonsmokers and 70% of Minnesota
smokers favored strict enforcement of the Minnesota law.12 9 New York
City has evidently been very effective in handling violations of its non-
smoking ordinance. The statistics as of March 1975 revealed an 88%
conviction rate.18 0
One recent commentator has criticized laws that make smoking in
indoor public places a crime as being the enforcement of moral condem-
nation through the criminal law.181 Dismissing the evidence that involun-
121. BRODY, supra note 31, at 105 (803 arrest citations were issued in 1975 for
violations); SMOKING DIGEST, supra note 39, at 84; 7 STUDENT LAw. 15, 56 (Mar.
1979).
122. SMOKING DIGEST, supra note 39, at 84.
123. KANSAS CrrY, Mo., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES §§ 26.43, .44 (1967).
124. ST. LoUIs, Mo., REVIsED CODE §§ 716.060(16), 792.010, 811.010 (1960).
125. GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Apr. 1979, at 118.
126. Id. at 120.
127. 7 STUDENT LAW. 15, 58 (Mar. 1979).
128. Id. Prosecutions under the Minnesota Clean Indoor Air Act reportedly
have decreased since the McKeever case. Id.
129. AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION OF WESTERN MISSOURI, SMOKING AND HEALTH
REPORT (Apr.-May 1979).
130. BRODY, supra note 31, at 105.
131. 7 STUDENT LAw. 15, 56-58 (Mar. 1979).
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tary smoking is harmful to nonsmokers, the commentator equates non-
smokers' rights legislation with laws concerning littering, dogs misbehaving
on public grass, and people playing their loud radios on the public bus.132
The major fallacy in this analysis is the non-recognition of the fact that
involuntary smoking is dangerous. 3 3 Unlike laws regulating morality,
Clean Air statutes are health measures, just as are laws penalizing drunk
driving. A statute prohibiting the consumption of alcoholic beverages
would dearly constitute government enforcement of moral judgments. A
statute prohibiting driving while intoxicated, however, is obviously de-
signed to protect the health and safety of other members of society. In the
same way, modern Clean Air legislation is not enacted to prohibit smokers
from smoking, as the old statutes were,13 4 but to prohibit them from
smoking in public places where their smoke might harm other members
of the public. 35
Another criticism of Clean Air legislation is the argument that if
nonsmokers are the majority of the population, and if they are bothered
or injured by cigarette smoke, they will stay away from public places
where smoking is allowed, and the ensuing economic pressure will force
proprietors to provide nonsmoking areas, without undesirable arm-twisting
by the government. The answer to this argument is that this problem is a
health issue, not an economic issue. Laws regarding the safety of food and
the safety of transportation exist. Laws regarding the safety of the air seem
equally important. In addition, common sense dictates that the nonsmoker
should not be forced to stay away from public places out of fear for his
health; rather, the smoker should be restricted to practicing his habit in
places where innocent bystanders will not be injured.
C. Federal Actions
Nonsmokers currently receive some protection from federal legislation
and regulations. The legislative protection has, to this point, been indirect.
Since 1965, the federal government has required each package of cigarettes
to bear a label warning of the dangers of cigarette smoking.1 3 6 Since 1971,
cigarette commercials have been banned from television and radio.'3 7 These
measures may have helped the nonsmoker by reducing the percentage of
the population that smokes, thereby reducing the exposure of the nonsmoker
132. Id. at 16.
183. The author reports that only 34 million people are allergic to tobacco
smoke, evidently considering that to be an insignificant number. Id. at 17.
134. See notes 14-16 and accompanying text supra.
135. See BRODY, supra note 31, at 112; Non-smoker, supra note 15, at 164. In a
recent case, the Virginia Supreme Court said that ordinances restricting smoking
in public places are "dearly within the police power of the legislature." Alford v.
City of Newport News, 260 S.E.2d 241, 243 (Va. 1979).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976).
137. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976).
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to tobacco smoke. Federal legislation that would directly protect non-
smokers, however, has been suggested, 138 but not passed.
Several federal regulations offer direct protection to nonsmokers. The
Department of Defense (D.O.D.) has a comprehensive regulation prohibit-
ing smoking in auditoriums, elevators, shuttle vehicles, medical care fa-
cilities, conference and class rooms, and work areas. 139 The regulation also
requires nonsmoking areas to be designated in D.O.D. eating facilities. The
General Services Administration has a similar regulation, which became
effective in April 1979.140 The Interstate Commerce Commission has a
regulation limiting the smoking section of a bus, when such a section is
provided at all, to the back thirty percent of the seats. 141 A Civil Aero-
nautics Board regulation requires passenger aircraft to provide a "No Smok-
ing" area large enough to include all passengers who want it.142 Smoking
is also prohibited in trains, except in designated areas.143
Expansion of federal legislation and regulation would have both
advantages and disadvantages. One advantage of a federal "Clean Indoor
Air Act" would be more nationwide uniformity. One of the problems
with enforcement of no-smoking legislation has been "the patchwork
quality of such legislation."'144 To illustrate, a resident of Missouri, who
has never been subjected to a no-smoking law, might assume that smoking
is allowed in a bus in California. Even a "No Smoking" sign might not
adequately inform him of the California law. Nevertheless, the health
hazard of smoking seems to be the type of public problem that is best
controlled by the state, rather than the federal government. Although the
federal government arguably has the power to enact a comprehensive non-
138. Massachusetts Representative Robert Drinan has introduced nonsmokers'
rights legislation several times. BRODY, supra note 31, at 118. The bill he introduced
in 1975 would have restricted smoking in all federal facilities and public facilities
associated with common carriers engaged in interstate commerce, and would have
guaranteed, as much as economically feasible, smoke-free work areas for federal
employees. Id.
139. 32 C.F.R. § 203 (1979).
140. AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION OF WESTERN MISSOURI, SMOKING AND HEALTH
REPORT (Sept. 1979).
141. 49 C.F.R. § 1061 (1979).
142. 14 C.F.R. § 252 (1979). This regulation was enacted in response to com-
plaints from nonsmokers and a government study showing that 60% of nonsmoking
passengers and 38% of all passengers were bothered by smoke. SMOKING DIGEST,
supra note 39, at 81. See also 38 FED. REG. 12,210 (1973).
143. 49 C.F.R. § 1124.21 (1979). In 1972, a nonsmoker was bothered by the
tobacco smoke in the first-class section of an Amtrak train. When he complained to
the conductor he was told that smoking was permitted in the first-class car, and if
he did not like it he could move to a second-class car. He later complained to Am-
trak officials and as a result of his influence, cigar and pipe smoking were banned
in the first-class club car of the train. Not all nonsmokers, though, have the clout
of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger. Tobacco Pollution and the Nonsmoker's Rights,
4 ENVT'L L. 451 (Spring 1974).
144. BRODY, supra note 31, at 106.
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smokers' rights statute, 45 uniformity can also be achieved by adoption of
uniform legislation by the states.' 46
V. CONSTITUTIONAL THEoRIEs
Commentators on the issue of nonsmokers' rights are fond of quoting
the observation of George Bernard Shaw that "smokers and non-smokers
cannot be equally free in the same railway carriage." 4 7 The pithy quote
captures the essence of the dilemma: should the smoker be permitted to
smoke, or should the nonsmoker's right to breathe clean air be protected?
Although many jurisdictions have resolved the problem through legislation,
in other jurisdictions the nonsmoker who seeks relief148 must try alternative
routes. One of these routes is constitutional law.
Three parts of the Constitution have been advocated as support for
the right of the nonsmoker to breathe clean air: (1) the ninth amendment;
(2) the fifth and fourteenth amendments; and (8) the first amendment.
At this -writing, no court has squarely accepted any of these arguments. 149
A good argument can be made that the ninth amendment protects
nonsmokers from cigarette smoke in public places. The ninth amendment
reads: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."'150 As
Justice Story wrote, the "Bill of Rights presumes the existence of a sub-
stantial body of rights not specifically enumerated but easily perceived in
the broad concept of liberty and so numerous and so obvious as to preclude
listing them."' 5 ' Therefore, as Professor Lawrence Tribe explains, the
ninth amendment "at least states a rule of construction pointing away
from the reverse incorporation view that only the interests secured by the
Bill of Rights are encompassed within the fourteenth amendment, and at
most provides a positive source of law for fundamental but unmentioned
145. A Federal Clean Indoor Air Act probably could be supported by the Com-
merce clause. BRODY, supra note 31, at 119.
146. The Minnesota Clean Indoor Air Act is often used as a model by other
states. SMomNG DIGEST, supra note 39, at 86.
147. Antismoking Legislation, supra note 14, at 167; lvon-Snoker, supra note
15, at 165; 7 STUDENT LAW. 15, 16 (Mar. 1979).
148. The nonsmoker considering legal action might be able to obtain organized
assistance. Action On Smoking and Health (ASH), 2000 H Street, N.W., Washing-
ton, D.C. 20006, is a national nonprofit organization dedicated to protecting the
rights of nonsmokers. The American Lung Association, 1740 Broadway, New York,
N.Y. 10019, might be of some help. Nonsmokers in the Midwest should contact the
American Lung Association of Western Missouri, 2007 Broadway, Kansas City, Mo.
64108.
149. The dictum of Environmental Defense Fund v. Hoerner Waldorf Corp.,
1 E.R. 1640, 3 E.L.R. 20,794 (D. Mont. 1970), supports a constitutional right to
dean air. See note 160 and accompanying text infra.
150. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
151. 3 J. STORY, ComENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNrTED STATES
715-16 (1833), quoted in L. TmBE, AMERUCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 570 (1978).
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rights." 115 2 Several authorities have argued persuasively that a basic un-
enumerated constitutional right is the right to breathe clean air.153 One
writer has said that "like food and water, the biological necessity of clean
air to support life dictates that the right to a healthful environment be
recognized, or all other rights are meaningless phrases."'154
Courts that have considered the issue of a fundamental right to a clean
environment under the ninth amendment have consistently refused to
recognize such a right.155 The issue was directly addressed in 1978 in
Gasper v. Louisana Stadium & Exposition District. 158 There, plaintiffs
brought a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enjoin officials from allow-
ing tobacco smoking during events in the enclosed Superdome. The district
court disagreed with the argument in no uncertain terms: "To hold that
the First, Fifth, Ninth, or Fourteenth Amendments recognize as funda-
mental the right to be free from cigarette smoke would be to mock the
lofty purposes of such amendments and broaden their penumbral pro-
tections to unheard-of boundaries."'157 The judge felt that the right to
breathe smoke-free air was not on a constitutional par with the right to
privacy in marriage, and he believed the legislative and executive branches
should make the "final decisions in matters of this type."' 5 8
Closely related to the ninth amendment claim are the claims made
under the fifth and fourteenth amendment due process dames. Under
these theories, forcing a nonsmoker to choose between staying in a smoke-
filled room where he has the right to be or leaving the area deprives him
152. L. TRIBE, supra note 151, at 570. Some of the fundamental but unenum-
crated rights that have been recognized are: the right to use birth control, Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); the right to travel abroad, Aptheker v. Secre-
tary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); the right to be free of certain bodily intrusions,
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); the right to procreate, Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); the right to send one's child to a private school, Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); and the right to teach one's child a foreign
language, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
153. Environmental Defense Fund v. Hoerer Waldorf Corp., 1 E.R. 1640, 3
E.L.R. 20,794 (D. Mont. 1970); BRODY, supra note 31, at 87-88; Ire, supra note 44,
at 72; Non.Smoker, supra note 15, at 143, 165; Comment, Toward Recognition of
Nonsmokers Rights in Illinois, 5 Loy. CHI. L.J. 610, 614 (1974).
154. Non-Smoker, supra note 15, at 143.
155. Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971); Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium
Exposition Dist., 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979);
Federal Employees for Non-smokers' Rights v. United States, 598 F.2d 310 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. dented, 100 S. Ct. 265 (1979); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Liti-
gation, 475 F. Supp. 928 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Pinkney v. Ohio Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, 375 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp.,
340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of
Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971); GASP v. Mecklenburg County, 42 N.C.
App. 228, 256 S.E.2d 477 (1979). But see the dictum in Environmental Defense
Fund v. Hoerner Waldorf Corp., 1 E.R. 1640, 1641, 3 E.L.R. 20,794, 20,799 (D.
Mont. 1970).
156. 577 F.2d 897 (1978), aff'g 418 F. Supp. 716 (1976). cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1073 (1979).
157. 418 F. Supp. at 721.
158. Id. at 722.
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of life and liberty under the due process dause.159 Advocates of this
argument believe the right to life involves a right to health. The dictum in
one environment case declared, "[T]he right to life and liberty and prop-
erty are constitutionally protected. Indeed the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments provide that these rights may not be denied without due
process of law, and surely a person's health is what, in a most significant
degree, sustains life."160 Since the due process clause has been read with
the ninth amendment to protect many unenumerated rights,' 6' including
the right to have an abortion,1 62 it seems reasonable that the right to clean
air be considered a fundamental right worthy of due process protection.
The Louisiana Stadium court rejected the due process claims, dis-
tinguishing the situation in the Superdome from that in Pollak v. Public
Utilities Commission,163 cited by the plaintiff. In Pollak, a bus company
enjoyed a virtual monopoly of the mass transit in the District of Columbia,
as a result of congressional authorization. The company contracted with a
radio station to install speakers in the buses and to play only that station's
programming. Plaintiffs were passengers who were forced to ride the bus
by the lack of alternative transportation. They claimed the forced listening
deprived them of liberty without due process of law. The District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals found that the arrangement violated
the fifth amendment. 64 The primary distinction between Pollak and
Louisiana Stadium is that the Superdome plaintiffs were not compelled
to use the facility, as were the plaintiffs in Pollak, who had no alternative
transportation. 65 This argument has been criticized, though, on the ground
that to live a "full, normal, and healthy" life, one will inevitably find it
necessary to be in public places. 166
Another recent case, Federal Employees for Non-Smokers' Rights v.
United States,'67 followed Louisiana Stadium and denied nonsmokers a
cause of action under the due process clause. In Federal Employees, plain-
tiffs were nonsmokers employed by the federal government, who sought an
injunction restricting smoking to designated areas of federal buildings. The
159. Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium &: Exposition Dist., 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.
1978), affg 418 F. Supp. 716 (1976), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979); Federal Em-
ployees for Non-Smokers' Rights v. United States, 598 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 265 (1979); BRODY, supra note 31, at 88-90; Non-Smoker, supra
note 15, at 143, 165-70.
160. Environmental Defense Fund v. Hoerner Waldorf Corp., 1 E.R. 1640,
1641, 3 E.L.R. 20,794, 20,794 (D. Mont. 1970).
161. See note 152 and accompanying text supra.
162. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
163. 191 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1951), rev'd, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
164. The Supreme Court held that there had not been a violation of due
process, and reversed the court of appeals. 343 U.S. 451, 465 (1952). The plaintiff
in Louisiana Stadium, however, argued that the Pollak Court had reversed on
grounds other than the due process issue. 418 F. Supp. 716, 719 (1976).
165. 418 F. Supp. at 720; BRODY, supra note 31, at 87.
166. Ire, supra note 44, at 80.
167. 598 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 265 (1979).
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court denied the plaintiffs' causes of action under the Constitution and the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 668(a), but re-
fused to dismiss the count brought under the common law duty of the
employer to make the workplace safe. 168
The first amendment argument was made in both Federal Employees
and Louisiana Stadium. The first amendment has been interpreted to pro-
tect the right to receive information and ideas freely. 169 The ability of the
nonsmoker to receive information is arguably impaired when smoking is
allowed in government buildings where ideas and information are trans-
mitted (e.g., schools, auditoriums, museums, libraries).1 70 The Louisiana
Stadium plaintiffs complained that their right to exposure to events at the
Superdome fit under this analysis.17 1 The Federal Employees plaintiffs
were an even better example since their right to exposure involved the
workplace situation, rather than a place of entertainment.1 72 In both cases
the Court rejected the first amendment argument.
One commentator has suggested that nonsmokers might have a con-
stitutional claim under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. He argues that when the state promotes legislation allowing
smoking in public buildings, people sensitive to tobacco smoke are denied
the equal protection of the law. In sanctioning smoking in public buildings,
he contends, the state is denying to the sensitive person what it warrants
to all other persons-the right of occupancy without harm to one's well-
being.173 This argument is unlikely to survive the traditional equal pro-
tection analysis. In equal protection, the rational basis test is usually used
to determine the legitimacy of government actions. Only if a fundamental
right or a suspect class is involved will the strict scrutiny/compelling state
interest test be used.17 4 Nonsmokers could hardly be called a suspect
class, 17 5 and most courts have not considered the right to clean air as funda-
mental.1 76 Thus, the rational basis test would be applied and the govern-
ment action would probably be upheld. The equal protection clause does
not seem a likely source of relief for nonsmokers.
A threshold problem with the equal protection argument is common
to all of the constitutional claims by nonsmokers-the necessary element of
state action. In the vast majority of cases, the problem is state inaction,
rather than action. Only two states, Arkansas and Pennsylvania, have
168. 446 F. Supp. 181, 182, affd, 598 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S.
Ct. 265 (1979).
169. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen.,
381 U.S. 301, 307-08 (1965); BRODY, supra note 31, at 86-87.
170. BRODY, supra note 31, at 86-87.
171. 418 F. Supp. at 717-18.
172. 446 F. Supp. at 183-85.
173. Non-Smoker, supra note 15, at 166.
174. See generally J. NowAX, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 524 (1978).
175. Id. at 525.
176. See note 155 and accompanying text supra.
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statutes specifically allowing smoking in public places.177 In fact, the
Pennsylvania statute goes so far as to prohibit city councils from passing
ordinances that would "prohibit smoking in any restaurant room, rest
room, beauty parlor, executive office or any room designated for smoking
in such store."' 7 8 In states other than Pennsylvania and Arkansas, however,
the state has taken no action allowing smoking. Under present state action
theory, it appears unlikely that state inaction would satisfy the state action
requirement. 179 Since most states have enacted some type of non-smoking
statute, however, state action might be found in passage of an inadequate
statute.'8 0 This argument also seems weak.
Realistically, the chances of succeeding under a constitutional theory
seem small for the nonsmoker at this stage of the legal conflict. The United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari for the Louisiana Stadium case in
January 1979,181 and for the Federal Employees case in October 1979.182
In light of the present Court's narrow interpretation of the concept of
"Constitutional Rights" in other cases,' 8 3 it seems unlikely this Court would
resolve these constitutional theories in favor of the nonsmoker.
VI. TORT Tmogus
A. Common Law Torts
When legislation has not provided nonsmokers an adequate remedy
at law, the common law has been found to provide protection. In what is
probably the single most significant legal stride in the nonsmokers' rights
movement, a New Jersey court ruled in Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tele-
phone Co.18 4 that the common law duty of the employer to provide a safe
workplace for employees mandates that the employer protect nonsmoking
employees from the hazard of second-hand cigarette smoke.
In Shimp, a case of first impression, plaintiff had been employed in
the offices of New Jersey Bell Telephone Company for several years. In
the early seventies she began suffering a variety of severe symptoms as a
result of an allergy to cigarette smoke.' 8 5 Her allergic reaction could be
177. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3702 (Cum. Supp. 1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,§3702 (Purdon 1972).
178. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 3702 (Purdon 1972).
179. See Ire, supra note 44, at 75.
180. Id.
181. 439 U.S. 1073 (1979).
182. 100 S. Ct. 265 (1979).
183. E.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
184. 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (App. Div. 1976), noted in Note, Torts-
Nonsmokers' Rights-Duty of Employer to Furnish Safe Working Environment Will
Support Injunction Against Smoking in the Work Area, 9 TEx. TcH. L. Ruv. 353
(1977); Note, Torts-Occupational Safety and Health-Employee's Common Law
Right to a Safe Workplace Compels Employer to Eliminate Unsafe Conditions, 30
VAND. L. REv. 1074 (1977).
185. Her symptoms included skin eruptions, SHim' Boot, supra note 46, at
60, as well as severe throat irritation, nasal irritation sometimes taking the form
of nosebleeds, irritation to the eyes resulting in corneal abrasion and corneal
erosion, headaches, nausea, and vomiting. 145 N.J. Super. at 521, 368 A.2d at 410.
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triggered by the presence of as little as one nearby smoker.186 In the office
to which she was transferred in 1975, seven of thirteen employees smoked
heavily.187 Shimp's utilization of company grievance mechanisms resulted
only in the installation of an ineffective exhaust fan.'88 Shimp was offered
the opportunity to move to a different location, but the move would have
entailed a demotion and a decrease in pay.'89 After seeking relief through
several governmental agencies, she brought suit in equity for injunctive
relief.
In a landmark opinion, Superior Court Judge Phillip A. Grucdo
carefully analyzed the relationship of the common law to the nonsmoker in
the workplace. He stated that an employee has a right to work in a safe
environment and an employer has a concomitant, affirmative duty to
provide a safe work area.'9 0 These are widely recognized common law
concepts.' 91 The court noted that the Occupational Safety and Health Act
did not preempt the field of occupational safety since it specifically recog-
nized the concurrent power of a state to affect the employee-employer
relationship through common law judicial and legislative action.192 The
judge recognized that cigarette smoke was toxic and dangerous to the
health of this plaintiff and that of smokers and nonsmokers generally.' 9 3
Judge Gruccio ruled that the plaintiff had not assumed the risk of harm
since cigarette smoke is not a natural by-product that is a necessary result
of the operation of the telephone business.' 94 The judge noted that New
Jersey Workmen's Compensation law might be a bar to monetary damages,
but did not prohibit a suit for injunctive relief.' 95 After considering the
issues and the evidence, the court granted the injunction, and ordered
New Jersey Bell to provide Shimp with safe working conditions "by
restricting the smoking of employees to the nonwork area presently used
as a lunch room" and prohibiting smoking "in the offices or adjacent
customer service area."'196
Although Shimp is a New Jersey case, it offers strong precedent for
nonsmoking workers in other jurisdictions. This would be especially true
in Missouri since a Missouri judge will probably find no local case directly
on point. Of particular precedential value in Shimp are the strong state-
ments of legal recognition of the dangers of cigarette smoke.197 Although a
186. 145 N.J. Super. at 521, 368 A.2d at 410.
187. SiMP BooK, supra note 46, at 61.
188. 145 N.J. Super. at 521, 368 A.2d at 410.
189. StuMP BooK, supra note 46, at 61-62.
190. 145 N.J. Super. at 521, 368 A.2d at 410.
191. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 526 (4th ed. 1971).
192. 145 N.J. Super. at 522, 368 A.2d at 410-11.
193. Id. at 526, 368 A.2d at 413.
194. Id. at 523, 368 A.2d at 411.
195. Id. at 524, 368 A.2d at 412.
196. Id. at 531, 368 A.2d at 416.
197. Id. at 526-31, 368 A.2d at 413-14. Legislative declarations in state statutes
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given jurisdiction might never have recognized tobacco smoke in the air
as an unsafe work environment in the past, the strong language of Shimp
and the ever-increasing medical evidence of the danger of involuntary
smoking may be enough to persuade a court of the real danger involved.
Although it might be argued that Shimp only supports plaintiffs with
allergic reactions to tobacco smoke, the New Jersey court recognized the
danger of tobacco smoke to nonsmokers in general, 198 as well as to those
with allergies. The only real problem for the plaintiff bringing a suit like
Shimp is that the subject is still new and controversial; a judge hesitant to
apply old law to a new fact situation, even when warranted by the evidence,
might be reluctant to follow Shimp.199
Shimp involved only the employer's common law duty of providing a
safe workplace, but different theories of common law duty might be found
to protect nonsmokers from cigarette smoke in other places. In states where
the legislature has not already dealt with the matter, the common law might
protect people from cigarette smoke in common carriers, theaters, lobbies,
bowling alleys, and other public and semi-public places where the person
in charge of the premises has been deemed to have a general duty to protect
people on the premises from harm. 200
B. Nuisance
Several authorities have suggested nuisance theories as a possible
remedy for the nonsmoker.20 1 The private nuisance tort is probably of
little use in this context 20 2 because of its definition as "a nontrespassory
invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land."20 3
In the normal situation where the nonsmoker is seeking relief from tobacco
smoke in public places, the use and enjoyment of his land will not be
involved. 204 One commentator has suggested, without citing authority,
that an interest in a seat at a sports event or theatrical performance might
be considered a limited property interest worthy of protection by private
198. 145 N.J. Super. at 526, 368 A.2d at 413.
199. Donna Shimp's lawyer emphasizes the importance of choosing a judge who
is "innovative and fearless and not hesitant to make new law if the evidence war-
rants it." SHimP BooK, supra note 46, at 45. He also feels it is important to make
a low-key presentation, showing that the case is simply one involving a worker's
right to a healthy environment based on the medical evidence presented. Id.
200. BRODY, supra note 31, at 82.
201. Id. at 83-86; Ire, supra note 44, at 81-86; Non-Smoker, supra note 15, at
155-57; Comment, Toward Recognition of Nonsmokers' Rights in Illinois, 5 Loy.
Cm. L.J. 610, 618-22 (1974).
202. See Ire, supra note 44, at 82.
203. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979) (emphasis added).
204. In a few unusual situations, the use or enjoyment of land would be im-
paired by cigarette smoke. For instance, a nonsmoker might suffer a health im-
pairment when his neighbors in an apartment building smoke heavily. See Ire,
supra note 44, at 82 n.97. The plaintiff would have to show, however, that the quan-
tity and probability of harm outweighs the utility of the conduct. RESTATETMIENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 822, 829 (1979).
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nuisance law. 205 A nonsmoker in Missouri may have a better chance of
success than those in most states because Missouri has a special line of cases
that do not require the use of land as an element of private nuisance.20 6
A private nuisance action by a nonsmoker against a smoker would none-
theless be a case of first impression and the outcome is highly uncertain.
The nonsmoking plaintiff seems to have a better chance of recovery
under the public nuisance theory.207 Several states specifically designate
smoking in public as a public nuisance. 208 Other statutes describe smoking
as a health hazard.209 In these states, a cause of action for public nuisance
can surely be brought; the question would be who could bring the suit.
Most states have a broad statute defining a public nuisance as "any activity
which interferes with the health and comfort of the public." 2 10 Under these
statutes, the plaintiff will have to show tobacco smoke is a health hazard
sufficiently substantial and unreasonable to constitute a public nuisance.211
If the smoking was done in a place prohibited by statute, however, the
statute would be persuasive evidence of the unreasonableness of the act.212
Because forty-seven states list at least one place where smoking is pro-
hibited,2 13 the public nuisance theory would seem to be available in most
states.
The principal problem with using the public nuisance theory is the
widely accepted limitation that a public nuisance claim may only be
brought by a public official acting on behalf of the public and not by a
private individual.21 4 Thus, the nonsmoker should first contact a local
prosecutor, the attorney general or designated health officials and try to
persuade one of them to bring the suit. Failing that, the individual himself
might be able to bring the public nuisance action. A private individual is
allowed to bring a public nuisance action if he can show he suffered
damage peculiar to himself and not shared in common by the rest of the
public. 215 Thus, the typical nonsmoker whose only injury is eye and nasal
irritation might not be able to bring a public nuisance claim because his
injury is arguably not different in kind from that of others.21 6 According
205. BRODY, supra note 31, at 83.
206. See cases cited in Comment, The Law of Private Nuisance in Missouri,
44 Mo. L. Rxv. 20, 23 n.12 (1979) (criticizing these cases as inappropriate appli-
cations of nuisance law).
207. See generally Ire, supra note 44, at 82; Non-Smoker, supra note 15, at 156.
208. See note 67 supra.
209. See note 66 supra.
210. Ire, supra note 44, at 82, citing Arizona, California, Oklahoma, and South
Dakota statutes.
211. Id. at 81-82.
212. Id. at 83, citing 58 AM. JuR. 2d Nuisances § 30 (1971).
213. See notes 57-63 and accompanying text supra.
214. W. PROSSER, supra note 191, at 586-87. One commentator speculates that
special injury may no longer be required. Comment, Toward Recognition of Non-
smokers' Rights in Illinois, 5 Loy. Cm. L.J. 610, 621 (1974).
215. W. PRoSSER, supra note 191, at 586; Comment, The Law of Private
Nuisance in Missouri, 44 Mo. L. REv. 20, 31 (1979).
216. Ire, supra note 44, at 85.
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to the Restatement of Torts, however, "when the public nuisance causes
personal injury to the plaintiff, the harm is normally considered different
in kind from that suffered by other members of the public and the tort
action may be maintained." 217 Moreover, even if the minor eye and nasal
irritation is not considered different in kind, individuals who suffer heart,
lung, or allergic conditions undoubtedly suffer an injury different in kind
from the general members of the public. 2 18
The remedies available under nuisance theories include damages and
injunctive relief.219 The plaintiff may recover damages for the injury to
his health, plus the value of any personal discomfort or inconvenience that
he has suffered.220 As a practical matter, however, these damages might
only be nominal.221 The availability of an injunction is probably more
valuable to the nonsmoker. 222 Although enjoining an individual who
smoked in a public place from doing so again might be an inefficient
method for dealing with smoking in public under many circumstances, 2 2 3
an injunction might be the perfect remedy in cases involving the workplace
or elevators, where the same smoker constantly comes into contact with
the plaintiff.224 The Restatement of Torts provides that the public official
is not the only party who can bring a suit for injunctive relief: a person
who has suffered damages different from those suffered by other people
may also seek an injunction.225
At least one suit has been brought in which the nonsmoking plaintiff
claimed public smoking was a public nuisance. In Stockler v. City of
Pontiac, 26 the plaintiff, a pipe smoker and season ticket holder for Detroit
Lions games, brought a public nuisance suit in his own name and in the
name of the state of Michigan.227 He claimed that smoking during events
in the 80,000-seat Pontiac Silverdome Stadium violated a local fire ordi-
nance and constituted a public nuisance. The court heard medical testi-
mony and other evidence and found that smoking in the stadium
constituted a public nuisance. The court issued a writ of mandamus
ordering the city to abate the nuisance by prohibiting smoking and the
sale of cigarettes within the facility. The city obtained a stay of the writ
and the suit was ultimately settled. The out-of-court settlement agreement
217. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 821C, Comment d (1979). See also id.,
Comment d, Illustration 2.
218. Ire, supra note 44, at 85.
219. W. PROSSER, supra note 191, at 602.
220. Id. at 603.
221. Ire, supra note 44, at 85.
222. Id.
223. BRODY, supra note 31, at 85; Comment, Toward Recognition of Nonsmok-
ers' Rights in Illinois, 5 Loy. Cm. L.J. 610, 621 (1974).
224. Ire, supra note 44, at 86.
225. RESTA__MENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 821C, Comment j (1979).
226. No. 75-131479 (Cir. Ct. Oakland County, Mich., Dec. 17, 1975).
227. See SMOXKNG DiGET, supra note 39, at 88; Ire, supra note 44, at 88 n.l1l.
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bans smoking in the stands, but permits it in concourse areas, restrooms,
and private boxes.228
C. Battery
A cause of action for battery is another possibility for the nonsmoker
in his legal conflict with the smoker. The results of a battery suit will
largely depend on the facts of each case. In the blatant example where
the smoker blows smoke directly into the face of the nonsmoker and says,
"I can afford to pay the finel," a battery action will lie.2 29 In other cases
where the smoker is quietly smoking and the nonsmoker across the aisle
becomes ill, the result is more questionable. 23 0
The Restatement of Torts states the elements of battery as: (1) intent
to cause a harmful or offensive contact, plus resulting (2) harmful or
offensive (3) contact.231 In order to succeed in a claim for battery, the
nonsmoker must establish three propositions: (1) breathing tobacco smoke
is a contact; (2) such contact was harmful or offensive; and (3) the smoker
intended the consequences of his act.
Exposure to cigarette smoke probably meets the requirement of a
"contact." There is no question that the particles of smoke do in fact come
into contact with the person of the nonsmoker.23 2 In fact, studies show
that because of the comparative chemistries of the human body and
cigarette smoke, the smoke is actually attracted to human bodies like
metal shavings to a magnet.233 Battery does not require direct application
of force by one person to another.23 4 It is enough that the defendant has
set into motion a force that ultimately produces the result. 23 5
Exposure to cigarette smoke probably meets the requirement of a
harmful or offensive contact. At least one case, 2386 several legislative
bodies, 237 and extensive medical evidence238 have recognized involuntary
exposure to cigarette smoke as dangerous to the nonsmoker. Even if it
were not dangerous, the contact would likely be offensive, particularly
since 75% of nonsmokers find it annoying to be around a smoker.23 9
Ordinary contacts that are "customary and reasonably necessary to the
common intercourse of life, such as a tap on the shoulder to attract at-
tention, a friendly grasp of the arm, or a casual jostling to make a
228. SMOKING DIGEST, supra note 39, at 88.
229. This was the fact situation of the Sabina Shalom incident, in which the
smoker was prosecuted under a state law, rather than being sued for battery. See
notes 125 & 126 and accompanying text supra.
230. Ire, supra note 44, at 88.
231. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965).
232. See Ire, supra note 44, at 87.
233. BRODY, supra note 31, at 32.
234. W. PROSSER, supra note 191, at 34.
235. Id. at 35.
236. See notes 184-200 and accompanying text supra.
237. See notes 66-71 and accompanying text supra.
238. See notes 37-49 and accompanying text supra.
239. See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
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passage, ' 240 on the other hand, have been held not to be offensive touch-
ings. Smoking, though, is certainly not reasonably necessary to the common
intercourse of life,241 and the effects of smoking appear to be more serious
than the slight jostlings mentioned by Dean Prosser. Nonetheless, a jury
might find the particular plaintiff involved did not suffer an offensive
contact. A stronger showing on this issue could, of course, be made by a
plaintiff who is one of the 34 million Americans allergic to tobacco
smoke.242
The most difficult element to prove in the battery case would be the
smoker's intent to commit the battery. All consequences that the actor
desires to bring about are intended.243 Thus, the smoker who blows smoke
in the face of the nonsmoker is guilty of battery and is liable for any actual
damages, even those that are unforeseeable,244 and may be liable for puni-
tive damages as well.245 Intent is not limited to consequences that are
desired, however. "If the actor knows that the consequences are certain,
or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is
treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result.1246
Thus, a smoker who knew involuntary smoking was harmful or offensive
to nonsmokers would be liable for smoking around them. A smoker who
honestly did not know of the danger would probably not be liable. If the
nonsmoker notifies the smoker that breathing second-hand smoke makes
him ill, it would seem the smoker should no longer be able to plead
ignorance.2 47
Battery has been involved in a few colorful nonsmokers' rights cases.
In Sidney, Australia, a smoker who intentionally blew smoke into the face
of a nonsmoker was found guilty of assault and fined $298.248 In North
Carolina, a postman made numerous complaints to his superior about the
240. W. PROSSER, supra note 191, at 37.
241. The Shimp court said: "There is no necessity to fll the air with tobacco
smoke in order to carry on defendant's business, so it cannot be regarded as an
occupational hazard which plaintiff has voluntarily assumed in pursuing a career
as a secretary." 145 N.J. Super. at 523, 368 A.2d at 411.
242. See text accompanying note 44 supra. But see McCracken v. Sloan, 40
N.C. App. 214, 252 S.E.2d 250 (1979). See notes 249-56 and accompanying text
infra.
243. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A, Comment b (1965).
244. W. PROSSER, supra note 191, at 35. As a practical matter, the damages will
often be too small to pay the cost of the suit. BRODY, supra note 31, at 78.
245. W. PROSSER, supra note 191, at 35.
246. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A, Comment b (1965).
247. Brody &: Brody would go a step further: "In fairness, a nonsmoker should
not be required to object to a smoker in order to establish a battery." BRODY, supra
note 31, at 77. The McCracken court, however, took the opposite view: "In exam-
ining the plaintiff's claim, we observe that it has been said 'it may be questioned
whether any individual can be permitted, by his own fiat, to erect a glass cage
around himself, and to announce that all physical contact with his person is at the
expense of liability.'" 40 N.C. App. at 217, 252 S.E.2d at 252 (citing W. PROSSER,
supra note 191, at 37).
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adverse health effects he had suffered at work from tobacco smoke in the
work environment. He finally asked for a sick leave because of his allergy
to the smoke. 249 The supervisor denied the request and summoned the
postman to a meeting to discuss the problem. The supervisor smoked a
cigar at the meeting, and the postman became ill and had to miss work
and seek medical care. The postman filed suit seeking actual damages of
$5,000 and punitive damages of $10,000.250 Although a doctor had testified
that the plaintiff had "severe respiratory problems when around cigarette
smoke," the court held in McCracken v. Sloan25 ' that there had been no
competent evidence presented that the plaintiff suffered a physical illness
from exposure to cigar smoke. The court stated:
We express no opinion as to what the result would be if there
were evidence of some physical injury, but on the facts of this
case we cannot hold it is an assault or battery for a person to be
subjected either to the apprehension of smelling cigar smoke or
the actual inhaling of the smoke. This is an apprehension of a
touching and a touching which must be endured in a crowded
world.25 2
The McCracken court arguably made two mistakes. First, the court
seemed to consider aggravation of an allergy to be a totally insignificant
harm. Actually, allergies to cigarette smoke can involve serious symp-
toms, 25 3 and the record before the court included expert testimony that
the plaintiff suffered "severe respiratory problems when around cigarette
smoke."25 4 Even if causing severe respiratory problems is not physical
harm, it certainly could be considered an offensive touching. The court's
second mistake, therefore, was requiring plaintiff to show a physical illness
in order to prove battery. Tort law in most jurisdictions,255 including
North Carolina,25 8 recognizes an offensive touching as sufficient.
D. Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress
The intentional infliction of mental distress tort has been mentioned
as a possible remedy available to the nonsmoker.25 7 Although at first
glance the tort does not seem to apply to smoking conflicts, closer exami-
nation reveals certain circumstances in which a plaintiff should be allowed
this cause of action.
To recover under a theory of intentional infliction of mental distress,
a plaintiff must show that the extreme and outrageous conduct of the
249. McCracken v. Sloan, 40 N.C. App. 214, 252 S.E.2d 250 (1979).
250. Ire, supra note 44, at 89 n.129.
251. 40 N.C. App. at 215, 252 S.E.2d at 251.
252. Id. at 217, 252 S.E.2d at 252.
253. See notes 43-45 and accompanying text supra.
254. 40 N.C. App. at 215, 252 S.E.2d at 251 (emphasis added).
255. E.g., Stowers v. Ardmore Acres Hosp., 19 Mich. App. 115, 126, 172 N.W.2d
497, 502-03 (1969); 6A C.J.S. Assault & Battery § 8 (1975).
256. Ormond v. Crampton, 16 N.C. App. 88, 191 S.E.2d 405, cert. denied, 282
N.C. 304, 192 S.E.2d 194 (1972).
257. Ire, supra note 44, at 89.
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defendant has caused him to suffer emotional distress.2 58 Bodily harm is
not required. The emotional distress might include "all highly unpleasant
mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, em-
barrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea." 259
In the majority of nonsmokers' rights cases, the requirement of
"extreme and outrageous conduct" would probably not be met. The
Restatement of Torts states it is not enough that an act be inconsiderate
and unkind. Rather, the Restatement would impose liability only where
the conduct of the defendant has been so atrocious and utterly intolerable
that the average member of the community would view the conduct and
exclaim, "Outrageous!" 260 The cases where cigarette smoking in public
can truly be considered "outrageous" are few.
Comment f to section 46 of the Restatement explains that the extreme
and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from the defendant's
knowledge that the plaintiff is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress,
by reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity. "The con-
duct may be heartless, flagrant, and outrageous when the actor proceeds
in the face of such knowledge, where it would not be so if he did not
know."261 For example, suppose the plaintiff were a nonsmoker who was
often bothered by smoking at his workplace. He had complained to his
supervisor about the problem, and his supervisor was well aware of plain-
tiff's aversion to cigarette smoke. Plaintiff was made sick at work by the
smoke and he went to the hospital. The supervisor visited the plaintiff in
the hospital room and blew smoke in his face. In these or similar circum-
stances, the average member of the community might well exclaim, "Out-
rageous!," and a cause of action for intentional infliction of mental distress
would lie.2 62
E. Strict Liability
It has been suggested that the smoker should be held strictly liable
for the injury he inflicts on the nonsmoker under the "abnormally danger-
ous activity" doctrine.20 3 Under this theory, a person who carries on an
abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for resulting harm to
the plaintiff, if the harm is the kind of harm that made the activity
dangerous in the first place.2 6 4 The paramount question in nonsmokers'
rights cases brought under this theory would be whether tobacco smoking
should be considered an abnormally dangerous activity.




262. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment f, Illustration 12(1965); Cf. notes 249-56 and accompanying text supra (the McCracken fact situa-
tion, see text accompanying notes 249 & 250 supra, arguably presents an intentional
infliction of mental distress).
263. BRODY, supra note 31, at 93-95.
264. RWSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977).
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The Restatement of Torts lists several factors to consider when de-
termining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, including: (I) the
existence of a high degree of risk of a great harm to others; (2) the in-
ability to eliminate the risk even by the use of reasonable care; (3) whether
the activity is a matter of common usage; (4) whether the activity is
appropriate to the place it is done; and (5) the extent to which its value to
the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.265 All six factors
do not have to be present in order for liability to be found, but all are
of importance.266
In applying these factors to the nonsmokers' rights setting, the prospects
for successful use of this theory seem remote. One factor that would be
insurmountable in most cases would be the requirement of "great harm."
Although the Restatement mentions nuclear explosions267 and the like,
persons suffering heart or lung disease might meet the requirement, as
might children.208 In the nonsmokers' favor are the facts that there would
be a high risk of harm to nonsmokers, the smoker cannot make the smoke
less dangerous by the use of reasonable care, smoking is inappropriate in
many enclosed indoor places, and smoking has little value to the commun-
ity as compared to its danger to involuntary smokers. When all of the
factors are considered, even though each does not have to be met, it would
seem the nonsmoker would rarely have a good cause of action under this
theory. As Professor Brody suggests, however, "Smoking in the intensive
care unit of a hospital may well be 'abnormally dangerous.' "269
F. Product Liability
An analysis of the product liability suits against tobacco companies is
somewhat beyond the scope of this Comment. It might be important for
the nonsmoker to keep in mind, though, that at one time during the late
fifties and early sixties, when the link between cigarette smoking and
cancer was suspected but not proven, several cancer victims brought product
liability actions against cigarette companies.2 70 Without exception, these
suits failed. In the mid-sixties, legal commentators felt suits against tobacco
companies would never overcome the assumption of the risk doctrine,
since the smoker knew just as much about the alleged danger of smoking
as did the tobacco companies.271
Product liability suits might well enjoy a revival, however, as a result
of the mounting evidence that involuntary smoking is harmful to innocent
265. Id. § 520.
266. Id., Comment f.
267. Id., Comment g.
268. BRODY, supra note 31, at 94; see notes 39-42 and accompanying text supra.
269. BRODY, supra note 31, at 94.
270. For a collection of cases and articles dealing with the product liability
suits against tobacco companies, see W. PROSSER, supra note 191, at 660 nn. 82 & 83.
271. See Wegman, Cigarettes and Health: A Legal Analysis, 51 CORNELL L.Q.
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bystanders near a smoker.27 2 Innocent bystanders, unlike smokers, do not
assume the risk. Modem tort cases have allowed bystanders to recover in
product liability cases. 273 Nevertheless, many difficulties would be en-
countered in such a suit: the plaintiff must convince the court to follow
the cases allowing a bystander to recover; the plaintiff must establish that
tobacco products are legally defective; the plaintiff must establish that the
tobacco product was a substantial factor in the cause of his injury; and
the plaintiff must convince the court that his claim is not frivolous. 27 4
VII. CONCLUSION
Less than a decade has passed since the 1972 Surgeon General's report
warned that cigarette smoke could be dangerous to nonsmokers who breathe
it involuntarily. As recognition of the danger to nonsmokers has increased,
the movement to solidify the rights of nonsmokers to be free from the
danger has also increased. State legislatures and courts should be given
credit for reacting fairly quickly to this significant health hazard. At the
present time, only fourteen states have not yet enacted a regulation or
statute giving some protection to nonsmokers. Although constitutional
arguments have failed so far, nonsmokers have had some success with tort
claims, particularly in the workplace situation. During the last decade,
nonsmokers have tested the water in a new area of law, with the clear
result that legal remedies now exist for the nonsmoker who cares enough
about his rights to seek legal help.
MORLEY SWINGLE
678, 719-21 (1966); Comment, Can Cigarettes Be Merchantable, Though They
Cause Cancer?, 6 ARiz. L. Rxv. 82, 91 (1964).
272. One lawyer who evidently feels such a revival is possible is Melvin Belli,
who is reportedly eager to find the right case. READER's DIorr, Feb. 1980, at 105.
273. See, e.g., Elmore v. American Motors Co., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75
Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969).
274. These issues are examined in BRODY, supra note 31, at 90-93.
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